Secure Search is the problem of retrieving from a database table (or any unsorted array) the records matching specified attributes, as in SQL SELECT queries, but where the database and the query are encrypted. Secure search has been the leading example for practical applications of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) starting in Gentry's seminal work; however, to the best of our knowledge all state-ofthe-art secure search algorithms to date are realized by a polynomial of degree Ω(m) for m the number of records, which is typically too slow in practice even for moderate size m.
Introduction
Storage and computation are rapidly becoming a commodity with an increasing trend of organizations and individuals (client) to outsource storage and computation to large third-party systems often called "the cloud" (server). Usually this requires the client to reveal its private records to the server so that the server would be able to run the computations for the client. With e-mail, medical, financial and other personal information transferring to the cloud, it is paramount to guarantee privacy on top of data availability while keeping the correctness of the computations.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [Gen09a, Gen09b] is an encryption scheme with the special property of enabling computing on the encrypted data, while simultaneously protecting its secrecy; see a survey in [HS14] . Specifically, FHE allows computing any algorithm on encrypted input (ciphertexts), with no decryption or access to the secret key that would compromise secrecy, yet succeeding in returning the encryption of the desired outcome. Furthermore, the computation is non-interactive and with low communication: the client only sends (encrypted) input x and a pointer to a function f and receives the (encrypted) output y = f (x), where the computation is done on the server's side, requiring no further interaction with the client.
The main challenge for designing algorithms that run on data encrypted with FHE is to present their computation as a low degree polynomial f , so that on inputs x the algorithm's output is f (x) (see examples in [NLV11, GLN13, LLAN14, YSK + 15, CKL15, LKS16, DGBL + 16]). Otherwise, a naive conversion of an algorithm for its FHE version might yield highly impractical result.
Secure search has been the hallmark example for useful FHE applications and the lead example in Gentry's PhD dissertation [Gen09a] . Here, the goal of the client is to search for an entry in an unsorted array, based on a lookup value. In the secure version, the server gets access only to encrypted versions for both the array and the lookup value, and returns an encrypted version of the index of the desired entry; see formal Definition 2.1.
Use case examples include secure search for a document matching a retrieval query in a corpus of sensitive documents, such as private emails, classified military documents, or sensitive corporate documents (here each array entry corresponds to a document specified by its list of words or more sophisticated indexing methods, and the lookup value is the retrieval query). Another example is a secure SQL search query in a database, e.g., searching for a patient's record in a medical database based on desired attributes (here the array correspond to database columns, and the lookup value specifies the desired attributes).
Nevertheless, despite the centrality of the secure search application, little progress has been made in making secure search feasible in practice, except for the settings where: (i) either there are only very few records in the database so that the server can return the entire indicator vector indicating for each entry whether or not it is a match for the lookup value [CKL15, YSK
+ 15] or (ii) the lookup value is guaranteed to have a unique match in the array [DSH14, cDD + 16], or (iii) for an unbounded number of matches the server returns all matches in time is polynomial in the number of matches [AFS17b] . Clearly, this is insufficient for the for use cases of secure search of large datasets and no a-priori unique of few matches guarantee.
Our Contribution
Our contributions in this work are as follow.
First solution to the secure search problem that is applicable to large datasets with unrestricted number of matches. Furthermore, it is non-interactive and with low-communication to the client. This is by suggesting a search algorithm that can be realized by a polynomial of degree that is only poly-logarithmic in the number m of input records. Prior solutions with low degree polynomials are only for the restricted
Novel Technique: Search Coreset and SPiRiT Sketch
Coreset is a data summarization C of a set P of items (e.g. points, vectors or database records) with respect to a set Q of queries (e.g. models, shapes, classifiers, points, lines) and a loss function f , such that f (P, q) is approximately the same as f (C, q) for every query q ∈ Q. The goal is to have provable bounds for (i) the size of C (say, 1/ε), (ii) the approximation error (say, ε ∈ (0, 1)) and (iii) construction time of C given (P, Q, f ). We can then run (possibly inefficient) existing algorithms and heuristics on the small coreset C, to obtain provably approximated solution for the optimal query (with respect to f ) of the original data.
The coreset is a paradigm in the sense that its exact definition, structure and properties change from paper to paper. Many coresets were recently suggested to solve main problems e.g. in computational geometry (e.g. [Phi16, Cla10, BMO + 11]), machine learning (e.g.[HCB16, BFL + 17]), numerical algebra [W + 14] and graph theory (e.g. [CLMS13] ).
New Search Coreset for Homomorphic Encryption.
In this paper we suggest to solve the secure search problem using coreset. The idea is that instead of requiring that all the computation will be done on the server, most of the computation will be done on the server. More precisely, the server sends to the client only a small set of encrypted indices, that we call search coreset. These coresets are small, and communicating them to the client, decrypting them, and decoding the desired result from the coreset is fast and require only little time on the client side. Concretely, in this work the coreset size and decoding time is polynomial in the output size, log m, where m is the input input array size. While it is not clear whether the search problem can be solved efficiently (i.e., via low-degree polynomials) only using the server, we prove in this paper that efficient and secure computation of our suggested search coreset on the server side is possible. Moreover, it reduces the existing state of the art of client computation time from exponential to polynomial in the output size.
Unlike traditional coreset, in this paper the coresets are exact in the sense that the data reduction does not introduce any additional error ε. Moreover, the goal is not to solve an optimization problem, but to suggest algorithm that can be realized by a low-degree polynomial.
Sketches can be considered as a special type of coresets, where given an n × d matrix P and a log n × n (fat) matrix S, the result C = SP is a log n × d ("sketch") vector. Many problems can be efficiently solved on the short sketch C instead of the long matrix P , by designing a corresponding (sketch) matrix S. See examples and surveys in [W + 14, KNW10, CW13, LNW14] . In this paper we focus on vectors P (setting d = 1).
SPiRiT Search Sketch is one of our main technical contribution. It is a search sketch that gets a nonnegative vector and returns the index of its first positive entry. It has independent interest beyond secure encryption, since unlike other Group Testing sketches (e.g. [INR10] ) it can be applied on non-sparse input vectors.
To use it, the server first turns the input vector into an (encrypted) indicator binary vector whose ith entry is 1 if and only if the ith input entry matches the desired lookup value (where a "match" is either by an equality condition or a generic condition such as Hamming/edit/Euclidean distance bound; see Algorithms 5 and Section 7 respectively). Then the search sketch is applied on the indicator vector, and the output is sent to the client. This S • P • i • R • i • T sketch is a composition of a Sketch, Pairwise, Root, and Tree matrices, together with a binary operator i(x) = isPositive(x) that returns 1 for each strictly positive entry in x, and 0 for x = 0. The design and proof of correctness of this new sketch for non-negative reals (independent of FHE) is described in Section 3.
SPiRiT for FHE. We observe that sketches have an important property that makes them very relevant to FHE: they can be implemented via low-degree (linear) polynomial. In fact, the matrices of our SPiRiT are binary and thus can be implemented as sums of subsets, without a single multiplication. Nevertheless, a naive realization would require to apply the polynomial over a large ring p, which (mainly due to the isPositive operator, see Lemma A.6) requires a polynomial of degree linear in the length m of the input array.
To reduce the degree to poly-logarithmic in input array length m, in Sections 4.2 we introduce a more involved version of SPiRiT that can be applied on small rings, but may not return the correct search result. The server executes this version over k = (log m) O(1) rings and returns the resulting k-coreset to the client. Using techniques such as the Chinese Remainder Theorem and a proper selection of prime ring sizes, we prove that the client is guaranteed to decode the desired index efficiently from this coreset.
Problem Statement and Main Result
In this section we give a formal statement of the search problem and our main result of efficient algorithm for secure search.
The Secure Search Problem
The goal of this paper is to solve the following search problem on encrypted input array and lookup value, efficiently under parallel secure computation model formally defined in this section.
Denote [m] = {1, · · · , m}; the entries of a vector array of length m ≥ 1 by array = (array(1), · · · , array(m)); and every vector is a column vector unless mentioned otherwise. Denote by x the encrypted value of a vector or a matrix x (where encryption of vectors is entry-by-entry and of values represented by t digits, e.g., binary representation, is digit-by-digit).
Definition 2.1 (Search Problem.) The goal of the search problem, given a (not necessarily sorted) array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1} m and a lookup value ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}, is to output
Here, and in the rest of the paper we assume that the minimum of an empty set is 0. The Secure-Search problem is the Search problem when computation is on encrypted data. That is, the input is ciphertexts array and encrypting array and respectively, and the output is a ciphertext f (array, ) encrypting the desired outcome f (array, ). Our computation model only assumes that the encryption is by any fully (or leveled) homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, e.g. [BGV12] , Such encryption schemes satisfy that given ciphertexts c 1 = x 1 , . . . , c n = x n one can evaluate polynomials f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) on the plaintext data x 1 , . . . , x n by manipulating only the ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c n , and obtaining as the outcome a ciphertext c = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ; see [Hal17] for a survey of FHE, and open implementations of such encryptions e.g. in HELib [HS13] . Here and throughout the paper f () is a polynomial over the finite ring Z p of integers modulo p (see Definitions A.1,A.3), where p is a parameter chosen during encryption, called the plaintext modulo; f (array, ) is the outcome of evaluating f () when assigning values array, to its undetermined variables.
In the context of our coreset paradigm, the output y = f (array, ) is a short sketch, named, Search Coreset, so that there is an efficient decoding algorithm to obtain from y the smallest index i * where array(i * ) = .
Definition 2.2 (Search Coreset) Let k, m ≥ 1 be a pair of integers, array ∈ R m and ∈ R. A vector y ∈ R k is a k-search coreset for (array, ) if, given only y, we can decode (compute) the smallest index i * of array that contains the lookup value , or i * = 0 if there is no such index.
The usage scenario is that the server computes y = f (array, ) while seeing encrypted values only, whereas the client decrypts and decodes to obtain the desired outcome i * :
Definition 2.3 (The Secure-Search Problem) Let k, m, r, array, and i * be as in Definition 2.1. The Search problem on (array, ) is securely solved by a non-interactive protocol between a server and a client with shared memory holding ciphertext array with plaintext modulo p if:
1. The client sends to the server encrypted lookup value and the corresponding ring modulus p.
2. The server evaluates a polynomial f (array, ) over Z p using homomorphic operations to obtain a ciphertext y = f (array, ) of a k-search-coreset y for (array, ), and sends y to the client.
3. The client decrypts y and decodes y to obtain the smallest index i * where array(i * ) = .
The server time is O(d + log s) for d, s the degree and size of the polynomial f (); see Definition A.1. The client time is the time to decode y. The overall time is the sum of client time and server time.
More generally, the server may compute several polynomials f 1 (), f 2 (), . . .. Moreover, the polynomials may be computed over distinct plaintext moduli p 1 , p 2 , . . ., provided that the server has ciphertexts array pj and pj corresponding for each plaintext moduli p j . The server time in this case is O(d + log s) for d, s the maximum degree and size over all polynomials. We call a protocol non-interactive if the server evaluates all polynomials in a single parallel call.
We ignored here the time it takes the client to encrypt and decrypt, because it is a property of the underlying encryption scheme and not the search algorithm we provide. To be more precise the client time includes also the time to encrypt and decrypt y, which require computing k = O(log 2 m) encryption/decryptions (each for distinct plaintext moduli).
Security guarantee. The server sees only encrypted values array , (and any values it computes from them, including the output f (array, ) ), while having no access to a decryption-key or any secret information. The security guaranty is therefore as provided by the underlying encryption. For the aforementioned schemes, the security achieved (under standard cryptographic assumption) is that of semantic security [GM84] , which is the golden standard in cryptography, saying essentially that seeing and manipulating the ciphertexts reveals no new information on the underlying plaintext data (beyond an upper bound on the data size).
Realization of algorithms by polynomial.
For clarity of the presentation we usually do not describe the polynomial explicitly. Instead, for each polynomial, we suggest algorithm Alg m,p,.. (x, y, . . .) that can be easily implemented ("realized") as a polynomial. The variables of the polynomial correspond to the input of the algorithm, represented as a concatenation (x, y, . . .) of the input variables. The evaluation of the polynomial corresponds to the output of the algorithm. Parameters such as m, p above are not part of the input nor the output, but part of the polynomial definition itself. For example, p may be an integer so that the sum and product operations in evaluating the polynomial are modulo p, and m may be the input length. Algorithm Alg(· · · ) with no subscript parameters is assumed to be run on a RAM-machine ("the client"). It may execute commands that cannot be evaluated via a low-degree polynomial. It is called non-interactive if it makes at most a single parallel call for evaluation of polynomials (on "the server").
Our Main Result
We aim to securely solve the search problem with overall running time poly-logarithmic in the length m of array, similarly to the running time of binary search on a sorted (non-encrypted) array, i.e., our question is:
Can we solve the Secure Search problem in time that is poly-logarithmic in the array size?
In this paper we answer this question affirmably (see details and proof in Theorem 4.8):
Theorem 2.4 (Secure Search) There exists a non-interactive protocol that securely solves the search problem on array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} m and ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, in overall time polynomial in log m and log r.
First-Positive via SPiRiT Sketch
The first step in our solution to the search problem is to reduce the input array to a binary indicator whose ith entry is 1 if and only if array(i) = . The search problem then reduces to finding the first positive entry in this indicator vector, as defined below. The main technical result of this paper is an algorithm for computing the first positive index securely on the server (i.e., via low-degree polynomials). For simplicity, in this section we first assume that Algorithm 1 SPiRiT m,p,r (array) runs on a RAM machine, over real numbers (ring of size p = ∞ in some sense). This result is of independent interest, with potential applications as explained in sketch literature over reals or group testing, e.g. to handle streaming data. In the next sections, we introduce more tools to show how to realized the same algorithm by a low-degree polynomial over a ring of size p ≥ 1. For this implementation, the matrices of SPiRiT remain essentially the same, but the implementation of isPositive p,t (·) for p < ∞ will be changed; see Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 1 provides a construction scheme for computing the first-positive index i * ∈ [m] of a nonnegative input vector array of length m. The output is the binary representation b of the desired index minus one, i * − 1, when i * > 0, and it is b = (0, . . . , 0) when i * = 0. (We comment that when the output is b = (0, . . . , 0) there is an ambiguity of whether i * = 1 or i * = 0; this is easily resolved by setting i * = 1 if array(1) > 0, and i * = 0 otherwise). The algorithm computes the composition of operators: S •P •i•R•i•T . Here, S, P, R and T are matrices (sometimes called sketch matrices), and i(·) = isPositive ∞,t (·) is an operator that gets a vector x of length t and returns (binary) indicator vector whose ith entry is 1 if and only if x(i) = 0 (where t = 2m − 1 in its first use, and t = m in the second).
Algorithm 1: SPiRiT m,p,r (array)
Parameters: Three integers m, p, r ≥ 1. In Section 3 only, we use p = ∞. Later, p is the ring size.
Input:
A vector array ∈ [0, ∞) m whose first positive index is i * ≥ 1; See Definition 3.1.
Output:
Binary representation b ∈ {0, 1} log 2 m of i * − 1.
/* See Section 3 for the definition of S, P, R, T and isPositive p,t .
The input is a vector array of length m, and the output is the binary representation of i * − 1 for i * > 0, and of 0 for array = (0, . . . , 0). The parameters p, r will be utilized in later sections, where the algorithm is assumed to be realized by a polynomial (i.e., run on encrypted data on the server): p ≥ 1 will represent the ring of the polynomial (in this section p = ∞), and r ≥ 1 will be the maximal value in array (here r = ∞). In Line 1 the input array is right multiplied by a (2m − 1) by m matrix T , called the tree matrix. in Line 2, the resulting vector w is replaced by an indicator vector w whose ith entry is 1 if and only if w(i) > 0. In Line 3, w is left multiplied by an m-by-(2m − 1) matrix R, called Roots matrix. In Line 4 we convert the resulting vector v to an indicator value as before. In Line 5, the resulting vector u is left multiplied by the log 2 m -by-m matrix SP . The matrix SP itself is a multiplication of two matrices: a Sketch matrix S and a Pairwise matrix P .
In the rest of the section, we define the components of S, P, i, R, T for m ≥ 1 and prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. Note that all these components are universal constants that can be computed in advance; see Definition A.2. Without loss of generality, we assume that m is a power of 2 (otherwise we pad the input array by zero entries).
The first matrix S is based on the following definition of a sketch matrix . 
m which has a single (s = 1) non-zero entry in its kth coordinate, yields the binary representation y = St ∈ {0, 1} log m of k. A (1, m)-sketch matrix S can be easily implemented by setting each column k = {1, . . . , m} to be the binary representation of k − 1. More generally and for future work where we wish to search for s ≥ 2 desired indices, an (s, m)-sketch matrix should be used. Efficient construction of an (s, m) sketch matrix for s ≥ 2 is more involved and is explained in e.g. [INR10] .
Pairwise matrix P ∈ {−1, 0, 1} m×m is a matrix whose right multiplication by a given vector u ∈ R m yields the vector t = P u of pairwise differences between consecutive entries in u, i.e., t(k) = u(k) − u(k − 1) for every k ∈ {1, · · · , m} and t(1) = u(1). Hence, every row of P has the form (0, · · · , −1, 1, · · · , 0). For example, if m = 7 and u = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) then t = P u = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0). More generally, if u is a binary vector that represents a step function, then t has a single non-zero entry. Indeed, this is the usage of the Pairwise sketch in SPiRiT.
The operator isPositive ∞,t (·), or i(·) for short, gets as input a vector v ∈ R t , and returns a binary vector u ∈ {0, 1} t where, for every k ∈ [t], we have u(k) = 0 if and only if v(k) = 0. In Section 4.1 we define isPositive p,t (·) for every integer p ≥ 1.
To define the next matrix, we define tree representation of a vector x, based on the common array representation of a tree as defined in [Cor09] . See Fig. 1 for a simple intuition of the tedious definitions for the matrix T , R, and the tree representation of x. is the vector w = wx = (28, 6, 22, 1, 5, 9, 13, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), which is the result of scanning the rows of T from top to bottom. The Tree matrix T has the property that wx = T x for every x. The label of each inner node is the sum of its children's labels. The sum of leaves' labels up to the i = 5th leaf from the left (labeled '4') is given by v(5) = x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4) + x(5) = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. More generally, v = vx = (0, 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, 21, 28). The root matrix R has the property that RT x = Rw = v.
To construct sparse R, we prove that every entry of v can be computed using only O(log m) labels. For example, 2 labels for its i = 5th entry v(5) as follows. First identify all the roots (ancestors) of the i + 1 = 6th leaf: 5,9,22,28 (black in the figure). Among these ancestors, select those who are right children: labels 5 and 22 in the figure. Finally, sum the labels over the left siblings of these selected ancestors: 4 and 6 (in green in the figure) to get the desired sum. Indeed, v(5) = 4 + 6 = 10. Definition 3.3 (tree/array representation) Let x = (x(1), · · · , x(m)) ∈ R m be a vector. The tree representation T (x) of x is the full binary tree of depth log 2 m, where each of its node is assigned a label as follows. The label of the ith leftmost leaf is x(i), for every i ∈ [m]. The label of each inner node of T (x) is defined recursively as the sum of the labels of its two children.
The array representation of x is the vector w = (w(1), · · · , w(2m − 1)) ∈ R 2m−1 , where w(1) is the label in the root of T (x), and for every j ∈ [m − 1] we define w(2j), w(2j + 1) respectively to be the labels of the left and right children of the node whose label is w(j); see Fig. 1 .
In particular, the last m entries of w are the entries of x = w(m), · · · , w(2m − 1) .
is a binary matrix such that 1. Each row of R has O(log m) non-zero entries.
For every tree representation
In particular, and for our main applications, if x is non-negative, then v(j) = 0 if and only if x(1) = x(2) = · · · = x(j) = 0. That is, v(j) tells whether j is equal-to or larger-than the index of the first positive entry in x. Below is our implementation of the matrix R, which also explains its name.
Implementation for the Roots matrix R Let x ∈ [0, ∞) m and w ∈ R 2m−1 be its tree representation. We need to design a row-sparse matrix R such that if v = Rw then v(j) = j k=1 x(k). Our main observation for implementing such a row-sparse matrix R is that v(j) can be computed by summing over only O(log m) labels in the tree T (x); specifically, the sum is over the labels of the set Siblings T (j + 1) of left-siblings of the ancestors (roots) of the (j + 1)th leaf; see Fig. 1 . By letting Siblings(j + 1) denote the corresponding indices of this set in the tree representation w = T x of x, we have
This equality holds because the left-siblings in Siblings T (j +1) partition the leaves x(1), . . . , x(j) into disjoint sets (with a set for each left-sibling), so the sum over each of these sets is the value of the corresponding labels in w.
The indices of these left-siblings is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.4 (Ancestors, Siblings) Let x = (x(1), · · · , x(m)) ∈ R m , and T = T (x) be the tree-representation of x. Consider the jth leftmost leaf in T for j ∈ [m]. We define Ancestors T (j) to be the set of ancestors nodes of this leaf. We denote by Siblings T (j) the union of left-sibling nodes over each ancestor in Ancestors T (j) who is a right-sibling of its parent node. Let w ∈ R 2m−1 be the array representation of T . We denote by Ancestors(j), Siblings(j) ⊆ [2m − 1] the set of indices in w that correspond to Ancestors T (j), and Siblings T (j) respectively.
From the above discussion we conclude the following implementation of R satisfies the definition for the Roots sketch matrix.
Lemma 3.5 (Roots sketch) Let R ∈ {0, 1} m×(2m−1) such that for every j ∈ [m] and ∈ [2m − 1] its entry in the jth row and th column is R(j, ) = 1 if ∈ Siblings(j + 1), and R(j, ) = 0 otherwise; see Definition 3.4 and Fig. 3 .3. Then R is a Roots sketch matrix as defined above.
The Tree matrix T ∈ {0, 1}
(2m−1)×m is a binary matrix that, after right multiplication by a vector x ∈ R m , returns its tree representation w ∈ R 2m−1 ; see Definition 3.3. The value w(i) is a linear combination of entries in x, specifically, the sum of the labels in the leaves of the sub-tree that is rooted in the inner node corresponding to w(i). Hence, such a matrix T that satisfies w = T x can be constructed by letting each row of T corresponds to a node u in T (x), and has 1 in every column j so that u is the the ancestor of the jth leaf. Note that this unique matrix T can be constructed obliviously and is independent of x. Proof. Proof appears in Appendix B.
Secure Search
In this section we use the result of the previous section to compute a k-search coreset for a given vector array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1} m via polynomials of low-degree.
Secure SPiRiT
To run SPiRiT over low-degree polynomials we implement isPositive p,t from the previous section via a polynomial over a ring of size p < ∞; see Appendix A.5. Using this implementation of isPositive p,t (x), we can realize SPiRiT in Algorithm 1 via a polynomial of degree (p − 1) 2 over a ring Z p . Since we aim for degree (log m)
m, we take p = (log m) O(1) . However, for such small p, the correctness of SPiRiT no longer holds (e.g., since summing m positive integers modulo p may result in 0 over such a small modulus p). Fortunately, we can still prove correctness under the condition specified in Lemma 4.2 below. In the next sections we design algorithms that ensure this condition is satisfied. 
Proof. Fix i * ∈ [m] (the case i * = 0 is trivial, details omitted). We first show that if p is A-correct then
SPiRiT m,p,r returns the binary representation b * of i * − 1. Denote x = array; and denote by i p (), i R () the isPositive operators used in SPiRiT m,p,r and SPiRiT m,∞,r respectively. Namely, these operators, given an integer vector map its entries to binary values, where i p () maps to 0 all multiples of p, and i R maps to 0 only on the real number zero. Let
(where the last equality is by construction of R). We show below that for all j ∈ [m], the following holds: Proof. Fix j < i * . We first show that T x(k) = 0 for all k ∈ Siblings(j + 1). For this purpose observe that
where the equality is by definition of the tree matrix T , and the inequality follows from k ∈ Siblings(j + 1) being an ancestor only of (a subset of) the first j leaves, and x being non-negative. The above implies that T x(k) = 0 because x(1) = . . . = x(j) = 0 for j smaller than the first positive index i * . We conclude therefore that i p ((T x mod p)(k)) = 0, and the sum of these values over all k ∈ Siblings(j + 1) is also zero:
Claim 4.4 Suppose p is A-correct for the set A = Ancestors(i * ). Then u(j) = 1 for all j ≥ i * .
Proof. Fix j ≥ i * . The key observation is that the intersection Ancestors(i * ) and Siblings(j+1) is non-empty:
The above holds because the left and right children v L , v R of the deepest common ancestor of i * and j + 1 must be the parents of i * and j + 1 respectively (because i * < j + 1), implying that v L is both an ancestor of i * and a left-sibling of the ancestor v R of j + 1. Namely, v L is in the intersection of Ancestors(i * ) and Siblings(j + 1). Now, since k * ∈ Ancestors(i * ) = A then,
Therefore, since k * ∈ Siblings(j + 1), we have the lower bound:
Conversely, since the above is a sum over at most |Siblings(j + 1)| ≤ log m < p bits (where the first inequality is a bound on the depth of a binary tree with m leaves, and the second inequality follows from the definition of P m,s ; see Definition 4.7), we have the upper bound:
We conclude therefore that the above is non-zero even when reduced modulo p: Proof. Multiplying u by the pairwise difference matrix P ∈ {−1, 0, 1} m×m returns the binary vector t = P u mod p in {0, 1} m defined by t(k) = u(k) − u(k − 1) (for u(0) = 0). This vector accepts value t(i * ) = 1 and values t(i) = 0 elsewhere. Multiplying t by the sketch S ∈ {0, 1} log m×m returns the binary vector y = St mod p in {0, 1} log m specifying the binary representation of i * − 1. We conclude that (SP · u mod p) is the binary representation of i * − 1.
Search Coreset's Item
As explained in Lemma 4.2, running SPiRiT on the server would yield a result that may not be the desired first positive index of the input vector, but will serve as an item in a k-coreset for search. Moreover, in the Search problem we are interested in the entry that consists of a given lookup value , and not on the first positive index. In this section we handle the latter issue.
Algorithm 2: SearchCoresetItem m,p,r (array, )
Parameters: Three integers m, p, r ≥ 1.
Input:
A vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} m and a lookup value ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} to search for.
Output:
An item of a search coreset that is constructed in For our main application the algorithm is to be run on encrypted data on the server side (i.e., realized by a polynomial). The fixed parameters are the integers m, p, r ≥ 1, where Z p is the ring in which all operations are computed, m is the size of the expected input array, and {0, . . . , r − 1} is the set of possible values for each entry. The input is array of m integers in {0, · · · , r − 1} with an additional integer ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} to look for in this array. The output of SearchCoresetItem m,p,r (array, ) is a vector b p of log m bits that, under the condition on p from Lemma 4.2, represents the smallest value i * − 1, where array(i * ) = . For example, if log m = 3, p = 10, array = (4, 2, 3, 9, 5, 4, 9, 2) and = 9 then i * −1 = 3 since array(4) = 9, and the output is b p = (0, 1, 1) .
In Line 1 we construct a length m binary array indicator whose value is 1 only on the entries where array contains the lookup value ; this is done via Algorithm 5 on the appendix. In Line 2 we return the first such entry, using Algorithm 1, which in turn calls the SPiRiT sketch. 
where indicator is the vector computed in Line 1 of Algorithms 2, and Ancestors(·) and the Tree matrix T are as defined in Section 3. If p is A-correct, then the output b p returned from SearchCoresetItem m,p,r (array, ) (see Algorithm 2) is the binary representation of i * − 1 (and b p = 0 log m if does not appear in array). Moreover, SearchCoresetItem m,p,r (array, ) can be realized by a non-interactive parallel call to log m polynomials (one for each output bit), each of log-size O(log m + log r) and degree O(p 2 log r).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemmas 4.2 and A.5, analyzing the correctness and complexity of SPiRiT and ToBinary respectively.
Note that if p ≥ m + 1, then p is A-correct and b p is the desired output: the binary representation of i * − 1, where array(i * ) = is the first occurrence of in array. Since in this case every item a ∈ A is upper bounded by the length m of indicator ∈ {0, 1} m , and thus a mod p = a. However, such a ring size p would result in a polynomial of a degree that is linear in m, whereas we desire for poly-logarithmic dependency. This is why we use k-coreset as explained in the next section.
Main Algorithm for Secure Search
In this section we present our main search algorithm that, given a vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} m , and a lookup value , returns the first index of array that contains . This is done by constructing a k-coreset where k = O(log 2 m). We prove that the algorithm can be implemented in efficient (poly-logarithmic in m) overall time. The coreset consists of the outputs of the same polynomial (secure algorithm that run on the server) over different small prime rings sizes. The resulting coreset is computed via a non-interactive parallel call from the client (RAM machine) who combines them to conclude the desired index i * that contains . The set of primes is denoted using the following definition. 6 return i * Overview of Algorithm 3. The algorithm runs on the client side (RAM machine) and its input is a vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} m together with a lookup value . In Line 1, P m, log m is a set of primes that can be computed in advance. In Line 2, the algorithm makes the following single non-interactive parallel call to the server. For every prime p ∈ P m, log m , Algorithm 2 is applied and returns a binary vector b p ∈ {0, 1} log m . We prove in Theorem 4.8 that the resulting set C of k = |P m, log m | binary vectors is a k-search coreset; see Definition 2.2. In particular, one of these vectors is the binary representation of i * − 1, where i * is the smallest entry that contains the desired lookup value . In Line 5 the client checks which of the coreset items indeed contain the lookup value. The smallest of these indices is then returned as output. We remark that if array cannot be accessed (for example, if array is maintained only on the server), we modify Algorithm 2 to return both b p and array(i p ) (see details in Section 7).
The following theorem is the main result of this paper, and suggests an efficient solution for the problem statement in Definition 2.1. We show that the set C contains desired output i * : By Lemma 4.2, if p is A-correct (see Definition 4.1) then b p is the binary representation of i * − 1. By Lemma 4.9 since |A| ≤ log m, then there exists a p * ∈ P that is A-correct. We conclude therefore that i * ∈ C. Finally, observe that as C ⊆ [m], then i * being the smallest index in [m] for which array(i * ) = , implies that i * is also the smallest index in C satisfying that array(i * ) = (or i * = 0 if no such index exists). Thus, the output min { i ∈ C | array(i) = } is equal to i * .
Complexity. The client executing Algorithm 3 first makes a non-interactive parallel call to compute SPiRiT p,m,r for the k = P m, log m values p ∈ P m, log m . Each such computation calls O(log m) polynomials (one polynomial for each bit of b p ), each of degree O(p 2 log r) and log-size O(log m + log r) (see Lemma 4.6). Next the client runs in O(k) time to process the returned values. By Definition 4.7, k = O(log 2 m/ log log m) = o(log 2 m); By Lemma 4.9, the magnitude of the primes p ∈ P m, log m is upper bounded by p = O(log 2 m). We conclude that Algorithm 3 can be computed in client time is O(k log m) = o(log 3 m), and a non-interactive parallel call to compute k log m = o(log 3 m) polynomials, each degree O(log 4 m log r) and log-size O(log m + log r).
Lemma 4.9 below states that for every set A of size at most s, there exists a prime p * ∈ P m,s so that p * is A-correct.
Lemma 4.9 (existential CRT sketch) For every integers m, s ≥ 1, the set P m,s (see Definition 4.7) satisfies the following properties.
1. For every set A ⊆ {0, . . . , m} of size at most s, there exists p * ∈ P m,s that is A-correct.
2. The magnitude of p ∈ P m,s is upper bounded by p = O(s log m).
Proof.
[of Lemma 4.9] Fix A ⊆ {0, . . . , m} of cardinality at most s. We first prove that there exists p * ∈ P m,s that is A-correct. Recall that p * is A-correct if for every a ∈ A, (a mod p * ) = 0 if-and-only-if a = 0 (see Definition 4.1). Clearly if a = 0 then (a mod p * ) = 0. Therefore, it suffices to show that if a = 0 then (a mod p * ) = 0. Namely, it suffices to show that there exists p * ∈ P m,s that divides none of the non-zero elements a in A. Consider an element a in A. Observe that a ≤ m has at most log b m prime divisors larger than b, and therefore, at most log b m divisors in P m,s . Thus, the number of elements p in P m,s so that p is a divisor on an element a ∈ A is at most s · log b m. Now since |P m,s | > s · log b m, then by the Pigeonhole principle there exists p * ∈ P m,s that divides none of the elements a ∈ A. Next we bound the magnitude of the primes p in P m,s . For this purpose recall that by the Prime Number Theorem (see, e.g., in [HW75] ) asymptotically we expect to find x/ ln x primes in the interval [1, x]. Thus, we expect to find Remark 4.10 To construct P m,s we simply take the first t = 1 + s log b m primes larger than b. This surely gives a set of t primes, though for small t these primes might not contained in the interval [b, t ln t]. Nonetheless, the above shows that for sufficiently large t, these primes are all of magnitude at most t ln t. This asymptotic statement is captured by the O() notation saying that the primes in P m,s are all of magnitude O(t ln t).
Practical Search Time Estimation Formula
When we move from theory to implementation, there are few additional factors to take into account. In this section we explain them and give a generic but simple formula for the estimated running time of our algorithm, based on this more involved analysis. In the next section and in Fig. 2 we show that indeed the formula quite accurately predicts the experimental results, at least for the configurations of our system that we checked.
We assume that the search is for a lookup value in array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1} m . Our formula for the overall running time is then •
• CORES is the number of computation machines (practically, number of core processors that work in parallel)
• SIM D (Single Instruction Multiple Data) is the amount of integers that are packed in a single ciphertext. This SIM D factor is a function of the ring size p = O(log 2 n) and L = log(d + log s) = O(log 2 log 2 n) for d, s upper bounds on the degree and size of evaluated polynomials; in HELib, this parameter can be read by calling EncryptedArray::size(), see [HS14] .
• ADD, M U L, and IsP OSIT IV E are the times for computing a single addition, multiplication, and the isPositive command (see Algorithm 6), respectively, in the contexts of parameters p and L.
For example, in our system (see next section) on input parameters range r = 1 and m = 255, 844, 736 array entries, we have SIM D = 122 and CORES = 64 resulting in n = 32, 767 packed ciphertexts; ring size p = 17; and measured timings of ADD = 0.123ms, M U L = 62.398ms, IsP OSIT IV E = 695.690ms. See Fig. 2 for graph of T on various m, r parameter.
Intuition behind Formula (1) Theorem 4.8 states a running time that is near-logarithmic in m. This is due to Definition 2.3 that allows us to evaluate unbounded number of polynomials in parallel, so using m machines we can search all the entries of the array in parallel. When using only CORES m machines, each machine suffers a running time slowdown by a factor of m/CORES. SIMD enables parallel computation that admits additional parallelization factor of SIM D, and the overall slowdown for a machine is thus n as defined above. The final time T is then the number of multiplication, additions and calls to isPositive that are used by the SPiRiT algorithm.
Power of SPiRiT. In a first look it seems that SPiRiT uses O(m 2 ) additions and mulitiplications, since this is the size of its matrices S, P, R, T . However, since these are binary matrices, their multiplication by a vector can be implemented by using only sum of subsets of items with no multiplications. Moreover, these matrices are usually sparse. Hence, the running time T is near-linear in n for each machine, as indeed occurs in practice; see Fig. 2 .
System and Experimental Results
In this section we describe the secure search system that we implemented using the algorithms in this paper. To our knowledge, this is the first implementation of such a search system. Our system can roughly search 100 Gigabytes of data per day using a cloud of 1000 machines on Amazon EC2 cloud. As our experiments show, the running time reduces near-linearly with the number of machines in a rate of 100 Mega bytes per day per machine. We expect that more advanced machines would significantly improve our running times, including existing machines on Amazon EC2 cloud that use e.g. more expensive GPUs.
The system is fully open source, and all our experiments are reproducible. We hope to extend and improve the system in future papers together with both the theoretical and practical community.
The System
System Overview.
We implemented the algorithms in this paper into a system that maintains an encrypted database that is stored on Amazon's AWS cloud. The system gets from the client an encrypted lookup value to search for, and a column name array in a database table of length m. The encryption is computed on the client's side using a secret key that is unknown to the server. The client can send the request through a web-browser, that can be run e.g. from a smart-phone or a laptop. The system then runs our secure search algorithm on the cloud, and returns a k-search coreset for (array, ); see Definition 2.2. The web browser then decrypts this coreset on the client's machine and uses it to compute the smallest index i * in array that contains , where i * = 0 if is not in array. As expected by the analysis, the decoding and decryption running time on the client side is negligible and practically all the search is done on the server's side (cloud). Database updates can be maintained between search calls, and support multiple users that share the same security key.
Hardware.
Our system is generic but in this section we evaluate it on Amazon's AWS cloud. We use one of the standard suggested grids of EC2 x1.32xlarge servers, each with 64 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2676 v3 (Haswell) cores and 1,952 GigaByte of RAM. Such cores are common in standard laptops.
Open Software and Security.
The algorithms were implemented in C + +. HELib library [HS13] was used for the FHE commands, including its usage of SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) technique. The source of our system is open under the GNU v3 license and can be found in []. Our system and all the experiments below use a security key of 80 bits of security. This setting can be easily changed by the client.
Experimental Results
In this sub-section we describe the experiments we run on our system and explain the results.
Data.
We run the system on a lookup value in a array of integers over two ranges: r = 2 and r = 2 64 . In the first case the vector was all zeroes except for a random index, and in the second case we use random integers. As expected from the analysis, the running time of our algorithm depends on the range r and length m of array, but not on the actual entries or the desired lookup value. This is since the server scans all the encrypted data anyway, as it cannot tell when the lookup value was found.
The Experiment.
We run our search algorithm as described in Section 4.3 for vectors (database table columns) of different length, ranging from m = 10 to m = 100, 000, 000 = 10 8 entries, and for r ∈ 2, 2 64 as explained above.
Results. Our experimental results for each machine on the cloud are summarized in the square points in Fig 2 and also in Table 1 . The client's decoding time was negligible in all the experiments, so the server's time equals to the overall running time. For example, from the graph we can see that the on a single machine we can search in a single day an array of more than 250,000,000 binary entries, and an estimate of 30,000,000 entries with values between 0 and 2 64 − 1. We also added additional 6 curves that are based on the search time Formula (1). As can be seen, the formula quite accurately predicts the actual running time.
Scalability The running time on each machine was almost identical (including the non-smooth steps; see below). Finally, since the parallel computations on the machines are almost independent ("embarrassingly parallel" [WA99] ), the running time decreases linearly when we add more machines (cores) to the cloud, as expected.
Comparison to theoretical analysis.
In Theorem 4.8 we proved that that the overall running of the search algorithm is only poly-logarithmic in m and r using a parallel call to m polynomials, i.e., a sufficiently large cloud. Based on the linear scalability property above, for each single machine we thus expect to get running time that is near-linear in m and r. This is indeed the case as explained in the previous paragraph.
Why the curves are not smooth?
Each of the curves in Fig. 2 has 4-5 non-continuous increasing steps. These are not artifacts or noise. They occur every time where the set P of primes, which depend on the length m, changes; see Algorithm 3. As can be seen in the analysis, this set changes the ring size p that are used by the SPiRiT sketch (see Algorithm 1), which in turn increases the depth of the polynomial that realizes isPositive (see Algorithm 6), which finally increases the server running time.
These steps are predicted and explained by the search time Formula (1) via the ceiling operator over the logs that make the time formula piecewise linear. 
Extension to Generic Search
We discuss here extensions of our results. First, our results extend to address searching for approximate rather than exact match, or more generally, for a generic definition of what constitutes a match to the lookup value. Second, while we assumed for simplicity that the input is given in binary representation, our results extends to other representations. Finally, the output of our algorithm can include the value array(i * ) on top of the index i * . These extensions are discussed in the following.
Generic search. The goal of generic search is to search for a match to a lookup value in a (not necessarily sorted) encrypted array, where what constitute a match is defined by an algorithm isMatch(a, b) that returns 1 if-and-only-if a, b are a match and 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.1 (Generic Search.) For isMatch(·, ·) returning binary values, on the input array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1} m and lookup value ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1}, the goal of generic search is to output
using a non-interactive algorithm. Proof. The algorithm for generic search is our Algorithm 3, where the only difference is in the implementation of ToBinary where we replace the calls to isEqual with calls to isMatch.
This may be useful, for example, in the context of bio-informatics DNA alignment problems, or, patternmatching problems in general, with isMatch() returning 1 on all entries array(i) whose edit-distance from the lookup value is smaller than a user defined threshold. Similarly, the distance metric for defining the desired matches may be the Hamming distance in the context of error-correcting-codes; the Euclidean distance for problems in computational geometry; the Root-Means-Square (RMS) for some machine-learning problems, or any other measure of prediction-error to be minimized; etc. Our results show that if isMatch can be computed efficient by the server, then the resulting algorithm is efficient. The former is known to hold for metrics of interest, including the hamming and edit distance [YSK + 15, CKL15].
Generic input representation. To handle input given in non binary representation, the only change needed is in the algorithm ToBinary, where we replace isEqual with a testing equality in the given representation. When this equality test is realized by a polynomial of degree d and size s, then the resulting ToBinary algorithm is realized by m polynomials of degree d and size s (executed in parallel). In particular, for native representation in ring Z p we can use for equality-testing the polynomial isZero p (a − b) of degree d = p − 1 and size s = 2.
Returning value together with index. To return the value array(i * ) on top of the index i * we utilize known techniques (e.g., from [DSH14, cDD
+ 16]) for returning array(i) given i with a linear degree polynomial. To keep the algorithm non-interactive, the search coreset items returned from Algorithm 2 include both the binary representation b of an index i and the value array(i); in Algorithm 3 the client then outputs both i * and array(i * ) (for i * as specified there).
Conclusions and Followup Work
In this work we show how to solve the secure search problem in overall time that is poly-logarithmic in the input array size. Our techniques can be extended to securely solving further problems in overall time in the input size, including securely returning all matching array entries [AFS17b] , and for secure optimization and learning [AFS17c] (for the former the time is polynomial also in the number of matching entries).
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A.2 Algorithmic Tools
In this section we present simple algorithms for the following tasks: (1) Algorithm 4 tests equality of two bit-strings; (2) Algorithm 5, given a vector of bit-strings array and a bit-string to look for, returns the indicator vector accepting 1 on all entries i where array(i) = and 0 otherwise; (3) Algorithm 6 given a vector of integers returns a binary vector with each entry x mapped to 0 if x is a multiple of the underlying ring modulus p, and 1 otherwise.
A.3 Comparison of Binary Vectors
The comparison of two numbers given by their binary representation (which can be considered as binary vectors over Z p , not necessarily p = 2) is particularly useful and simple; see Algorithm 4 and the discussion below. 
Output:
Return 1 if-and-only-if a = b, and 0 otherwise.
For two bits a, b ∈ {0, 1}, their squared difference (a − b) 2 is 0 if-and-only-if they are equal, and it is 1 otherwise. Hence,
2 is a degree 2 polynomial for the equality-test, evaluating to 1 if-and-only-if a = b and 0 otherwise. For bit-strings a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) and (b 1 , . . . , b t ) in {0, 1} t , the equalitytest simply computes the AN D of all bit-wise equality test with the degree 2t polynomial:
The correctness of the equality-test holds over the ring Z p for every p ≥ 2. Hence, the polynomial that corresponds to Algorithm 4 can be over any such ring. 
A.4 Reduction to Binary Vector
Algorithm ToBinary reduces a given pair of vector array ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} m and lookup value ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} to the indicator vector indicator ∈ {0, 1} m indicating for each i ∈ [m] whether array(i) and are an exact match. That is, indicator(i) = 1 if-and-only-if array(i) = .
For simplicity of the presentation we assume here that the input values array(i) and are given in binary representation and that we seek exact match array(i) = . Nevertheless, ToBinary algorithm easily extends to handle other input representations, as well as approximate search; see Section 7.
Algorithm 5: ToBinary m,r (array, )
Parameters: Two integers m, r ≥ 1.
Input:
array ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1} m , a lookup value ∈ {0, · · · , r − 1} where values are given in binary representation using t = O(log r) bits. Output:
indicator ∈ {0, 1} m such that indicator(i) = 1 if array(i)) = and 0 otherwise. m has a single non-zero entry at i * .
• St ∈ {0, 1} log m is the binary representation of the index i * for the unique non-zero entry in t.
We conclude therefore that output b = SPiRiT · x is the binary representation of the first positive entry in x, as required.
Claim B.1 (Tree Matrix T ∈ {0, 1} (2m−1)×m ) For every x ∈ R m , T x ∈ R 2m−1 is the tree-representation of x (see Definition 3.3).
Proof. The Tree Matrix T ∈ {0, 1} (2m−1)×m : Fix x ∈ R m , and a row k in T . The kth row corresponds to a node u in the tree representation and is the indicator vector for the leaves rooted at u, thus the inner product of this row with vector x gives the sum of keys over the leaves rooted at u. Namely, w = T x ∈ R 2m−1 is the tree-representation of x.
Claim B.2 (isPositive operator on T x) For every x ∈ R m and w = T x ∈ R 2m−1 , w = isPositive R,2m−1 (w) ∈ {0, 1} 2m−1 satisfies that w (k) = 1 if-and-only-if there is a leaf with non-zero key among the leaves rooted at node (indexed by) k.
Proof. The isPositive R,2m−1 operator applied on T x: Fix x ∈ R m and w = T x ∈ R 2m−1 the tree representation of x. Let w = isPositive R,2m−1 (w) ∈ {0, 1} 2m−1 . Then, w (k) = 1 if-and-only-if w(k) = 0, where by the definition of tree representation, the latter holds if-and-only-if among the leaves rooted at (node indexed by) k there is a leaf with non-zero key. To prove (iii), first observer that
because the left-siblings (corresponding to indexes) in Siblings(j + 1) partition the leaves x(1), . . . , x(j) into disjoint sets (with a set for each left-sibling, containing all leaves x(i) for which the left-sibling is an ancestor), and T x(k) is the sum of values x(i) over all leaves for which that left-sibling (indexed by) k is an ancestor. Next observe that by definition of the isPositive operator i(), Claim B.5 (Pairwise Sketch P ∈ {0, 1} m×m ) For every u ∈ {0, 1} m representing a step function (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1) with 1 value at entry i * , P u ∈ {0, 1} m has a single non-zero entry at i * .
Proof. Pairwise Sketch P ∈ {0, 1} m×m : Observe that P u(i) = u(i) − u(i − 1) is the discrete derivative of u, which is equal to zero on every entry i where u(i) = u(i − 1) and non-zero otherwise. For t a vector representing a step-function with transition from 0 to 1 values at entry u(i * ) = 1, we get the value P u(i * ) = 1 − 0 = 1 on i * and values P u(i) = u(i) − u(i − 1) = 0 for all i = i * .
Claim B.6 (The Sketch S ∈ {0, 1} log m×m ) For every 1-sparse t ∈ {0, 1} m , then St ∈ {0, 1} log m is the binary representation of the index i * for the unique non-zero entry in t.
Proof. The Sketch S ∈ {0, 1} log m×m : Proof follows immediately from taking S to be a (1, m)-sketch. It is easy to see that the specified matrix is indeed a (1, m)-sketch: Note that the first column of S is the binary representations of 0, the next column is the binary representation of 1, and so forth, to the last column specifying the binary representation of m. For t with a single non-zero entry at entry i * , the product St is simply the i * -th column of S, which is in turn simply the binary representation of the index i * .
